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Abstract: Accountability and control of state revenues and expenditures in the 
Athenian state of the Golden Age was achieved through the verification process 
by three board of state accountants, based on the accounting records of execu-
tion and related budgetary and other documents. More specifically, the purpose 
of this process was to (a) strengthen the integrity of the accounting system by 
providing additional controls in the management or state resources, (b) establish 
accountability against any public officials in charge of public funds, and (c) pro-
vide dependable reports to the people on the management of these funds. The 
three boards were the Council Accountants, the Administration Accountants and 
the Examiners. Although the main purpose of the attest function was the dis-
covery of fraud, internal controls were also evaluated by comparing the formal-
ized budgets with the accounting records of execution. This conclusion is some-
what contrary to the assumption that internal controls were not recognized in 
ancient times. 
In addition to the use of individualized budgets by the Athenian 
state of the Golden Age of Greece,1 accountability and control of 
state revenues and expenditures was achieved through the verifica-
tion process by three boards of state accountants, based on the ac-
counting records of execution and related budgetary and other doc-
uments. More specifically, the purpose of this process was to 
(a) strengthen the integrity of the accounting system by providing 
additional controls in the management of state resources, (b) estab-
lish accountability against any public officials in charge of public 
funds, and (c) provide dependable reports to the people on the man-
agement of these funds. 
The requirement for audit 
The Athenian State of the Golden Age was organized under a sys-
tem characterized by division of authority, due to the people's dis-
trust of a centralized government. Thus, the business affairs of the 
state were administered jointly by various boards which consisted 
of groups of individuals selected or appointed by lot. These boards 
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bore various titles, such as logistai (accountants), euthynoi (exam-
iners), and the like. Each board usually consisted of ten members, 
one from each tribe, so that each was represented. The focal point 
of all these boards was the Council which was charged with full re-
sponsibility for the management of all political and economic affairs 
of the state. 
The Council elected qualified people by lot from its membership 
to perform various accounting duties. Thus, accountants were the 
persons who dealt with the work of keeping the accounts and ac-
counting offices were the places where these people worked and 
kept the records. The magistrates then, who administered the pub-
lic funds, were accountable or under account, being subject to both 
the examination and audit upon the expiration of their term of office. 
Once the execution of plans was properly authorized through bud-
gets or other documents, these public officials were then appointed 
and charged with the responsibility to collect revenues or to incur 
expenditures according to the authorization given. Before entering 
office, they were required to submit to a formal scrutiny by an exam-
ining body which was usually a law court. 
The next step was to make sure that these public officials admin-
istered the public funds according to the will of the people and 
within the existing laws and regulations. It was necessary to demon-
strate that the integrity of the system had been preserved. This was 
the responsibility of professional people known as logistai (accoun-
tants), to whom the Athenian Constitution2 had granted this author-
ity and responsibility. The Constitution provided for the rigorous 
audit of the records of all public officers at the close of their year 
of office. It dealt not only with the handling of public funds, but it 
also required that every official act be passed upon a board of state 
accountants. The accountants' findings were subject to a review by 
a court.3 The Constitution also gave full opportunity to any citizen 
to bring charges against the magistrates for any improper or illegal 
action. 
In the work of Aeschines we find more detail information as to 
who these magistrates were and what legal restrictions were im-
posed upon them during the period for which they were "answer-
able". This period ran from the time their office ended until they 
had undergone final examination. Accordingly, he states: 
In this city so ancient and so great, no man who has held 
any public trust is free from audit. 
Then, he continues, specifying whom the law considers as being ac-
countable: 
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. . . (a) priests and priestesses be subject to audit, all col-
lectively, and each severally and individually; (b) the 
triearchs be subject to audit, though they have no public 
funds in their hands; (c) the Council of Aeropagus is re-
quired by the law to file its accounts with the Board of 
Auditors and to submit to their examination; and (d) the 
Council of the Five Hundred to be subject to the audit.4 
As to legal restriction, Aeschines also states that: 
, . . the person who is subject to audit shall be crowned 
after he shall have rendered account and submitted to 
audit of his office.5 
Also, 
. . . the officer who has not yet submitted his accounts 
shall not leave the country. Furthermore, the man who is 
subject to audit is not allowed to consecrate his property, 
or to make a votive offering, or to receive adoption, or to 
dispose of his property by will; and he is under many other 
prohibitions. 
. . . A man who has received no public funds and spent 
none, but has simply had something to do with adminis-
trative matters is also commanded to render accounts to 
the auditors. The law commands him to file precisely this 
statement: "I have neither received nor spent any public 
funds." There is nothing in all the state that is exempt 
from audit, investigation, and examination.6 
Such legal requirements made the administration of public funds by 
the magistrates more effective. Finally, public officials were re-
quired to maintain accounts for amounts received, spent, and bal-
ances, and keep decrees of authorization and other supporting doc-
uments in the Council Chamber. This requirement was necessary 
so that the verification process by the three boards of state accoun-
tants could be executed more effectively. The accounting boards 
and the nature of the accounting work are adequately explained by 
Aristotle in his Constitution. He distinguishes between three boards 
of accountants, each of ten men; the Council Accountants, the Ad-
ministration Accountants, assisted by ten Assessors, and ten Exam-
iners, assisted by twenty Assessors. Together these accountants 
constituted the highest scrutinizing authority in Athens. The nature 
of their office, i.e., their qualifications and methods of selection are 
explained below. 
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Function of the Board of Council Accountants 
The ten Council Accountants were selected from the five hundred 
members of the Council. This was essential since the Council exer-
cised supreme authority regarding the economic affairs of the state. 
The selection procedures and the accountants' duties are explained 
by Aristotle, stating that "the Council also elect by lot ten of their 
own body Accountants, to keep the accounts of the officials for each 
presidency."7 These people performed a function similar to that of 
internal auditors. Thus, they were charged with the responsibility of 
scrutinizing regularly the financial dealings of all magistrates, par-
ticularly those who administered public funds. Such a system pro-
vided for a continuing audit which accomplished two objectives: 
(a) it helped protect the financial resources of the state, since any 
possible case of embezzlement or fraud could be detected and 
remedied earlier; and (b) it prepared the groundwork for the final 
independent audit and examination of the magistrates performed by 
the next board of auditors, known as Administration Accountants. 
Function of the Board of Administration Accountants 
These Administration Accountants performed a second type of 
economic investigation, i.e., a kind of independent audit, when the 
public officials were relinquishing their offices. Accordingly, the 
Council: 
. . . elect by lot ten Auditors and ten Assessors with them 
to whom all retiring officials have to render account. For 
these are the only magistrates who audit the returns of 
officials liable to account and bring the audits before the 
Jury-courts.8 
Dealing principally with the financial side of the magistrate's gov-
ernment, they were the sole authorities who investigated both the 
financial and administrative transactions of an "answerable" magis-
trate. 
The audit work had to be performed by the ten auditors and their 
ten assistant or advocates within thirty days of the date of expiration 
of the magistrate's term. To carry out the final scrutiny in such a 
short period of time required hard work by the auditors and their 
assistants. However, the groundwork for their task had been done 
by the Council Accountants, who had investigated the accounts in 
each prytany (a period lasting 36 to 37 days). The audit was based 
on objective evidence furnished by the records. The auditors had 
to be impartial and fair in performing their work. In other words, 
4
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When we take our seats to audit the accounts of expendi-
tures, it doubtless sometimes happens that we come from 
home with a false impression; nevertheless, when the ac-
counts have been balanced, no man is so stubborn as to 
refuse, before he leaves the room, to assent to that con-
clusion, whatever it may be, which the figures themselves 
establish.9 
The magistrate first had to submit his account in person as the 
first step in the auditing procedure. Then, he testified that he now 
gave up the office entrusted in him, and that he awaited his sum-
mons to an audit before the board of accountants. At the same time 
he submitted the relevant report to the Secretary of the Council,10 
who attended Council meetings, and was responsible for the safe-
guarding of all decrees and other official documents. The collabo-
ration between the Secretary and the accountants was necessary, 
because the latter checked the magistrate's report against the offi-
cial documents kept in the Council Chamber. Immediately after the 
audit of the accounts, the Administration Accountants summoned 
the magistrates to the Accounting Offices to render the accounts 
and to submit to examination once more in public. If the Adminis-
trative Accountants' findings were unfavorable to the magistrate, 
their report was turned over to the jury-court for further action. 
The Jury-Court 
Aristotle, in his Constitution, as well as the orators Aeschines and 
Demosthenes in their private speeches, provide an abundant and 
reliable compilation of information about the jurisdiction of the jury-
court. After a public official had terminated his office the auditors 
submitted the results of their audits to these courts for public hear-
ing. Accordingly, 
. . . if an official is proven to have committed peculation 
the jury convict him of peculation, and the fine is ten 
times the amount of which he is found guilty; and if they 
show that a man has taken bribes and the Jury convict, 
they assess the value of the bribes and in this case the 
fine is ten times the amount; but if they find him guilty of 
maladministration, they assess the damage, and the fine 
paid is the amount only, provided that it is paid before the 
ninth presidency, otherwise it is doubled. But a fine of ten 
times the amount is not doubled.11 
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For example, in one case Theocrines was charged to pay a fine of 
seven hundred drachmas which he was sentenced at the audit to pay 
to the eponymus of his tribe.12 In addition to their findings, the 
Board of Administrative Accountants was allowed by law and custom 
to make the following proclamation in front of the Jury-Court in the 
process of public hearing: "Who wishes to prefer charges?" This 
gave the opportunity to any citizen to make an accusation against 
public officials. This procedure, which had the obvious purpose of 
establishing closer control over the magistrates, was criticized by 
Demosthenes as "the harsh enactments made against the common 
people."14 His statement may be justified, because under such law 
even the most virtuous magistrate might be the victim of an adverse 
verdict given according to a false accusation made by some citizen. 
Finally, the auditors had the power themselves to bring an "answer-
able" official before the court for theft, provided their audit had 
shown him guilty of embezzlement. Similar power was given to them 
to summon any magistrate to the law courts, even though the results 
of the audit were negative. However, because the large number of 
officials who had to render their accounts, they could not be brought 
before the court a second time. In other words, the law did not 
allow the same person to be subject to trials, examinations, or coun-
ter-proceedings a second time on the same charge. 
The previous discussion indicates that the judicial proceedings 
followed the customary judicial course of the defense of the magis-
trate under accusation. The verdict of the jury followed. It also in-
dicates that the auditors themselves assumed judicial responsibility 
in that they presided over the court and their assistants read out 
the charges. 
After the "answerable" magistrate had appeared before the court 
and had publicly passed his examination, he was regarded as hav-
ing "submitted to examination in the lawcourts, according to the 
law." The auditor then reported the findings by engraving them in 
marble and exhibiting them to the public so that every citizen could 
become informed with regard to the management of public funds. 
Exhibit A illustrates the kind of reports prepared and published by 
the independent auditors. 
Function of the Board of Examiners 
Even with these rigorous auditing requirements, the state was not 
satisfied as to the proper management of its funds. The fact that 
the magistrate had submitted to examination did not signify his full 
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and final discharge from his accountability. An additional assurance 
was deemed necessary through another scrutinizing process, exer-
cized by a third accounting board, the Examiners. 
The procedures for their selection and duties are well described 
by Aristotle, stating that the Council also 
. . . elect by lot Auditors (Examiners), one for each tribe, 
and two Assessors for each Auditor and if anyone wished 
to prefer a charge against any magistrate who has rendered 
his accounts before the Jury-Court, he writes on a table 
his own name and that of the defendant, and the offenses 
of which he accuses him and he gives it to the Auditor: 
and the Auditor takes it and reads it, and if he considers 
the charges proven, he hands it over to the Jury-Courts.15 
These ten examiners and their twenty assessors did not form part of 
the Council. The assessors took their seats at the market-place, 
which was the most frequented part of the city. They accepted ac-
cusations by any citizen against magistrates who had already sub-
mitted to examination. The accusations were written on a "white-
washed tablet" and were given to the Examiner of the tribe to which 
the magistrate belonged. The Examiner at once held a preliminary 
inquiry and, along with the assessors, investigated the charge. Pri-
vate charges were brought before the "the local judges," while 
public charges were brought before the Thesmothetae (legislators), 
who introduced the case to the Heliaia, (the Supreme Criminal 
Court), whose decisions were final and could not be reversed. 
Other Functions of the State Accountants 
In addition to the regular accounting duties, accountants often as-
sumed the task of conducting unannounced audits at irregular time 
intervals in those cases where it was considered necessary. This 
was very common with regard to the handling of funds for the pay-
ment of mercenary troops. The size of these funds along with the 
weak payroll system used gave many opportunities for dishonesty, 
especially in the padding of the rolls, and auditors were sent out to 
check the accounts on the spot. Aeschines, for example, mentions 
that Demosthenes was charged in a conspiracy of having padded 
the rolls and an inspector (auditor) of the mercenary troops was 
sent to Eretria.16 
Finally, the accountants audited the work of the Hellenotamiae, 
whose duty it was to collect the tribute due to Athens by the allies 
and deposit 1/60 of the total in the Treasury of Goddess Athena. 
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So, without exception, any person who had held any public trust was 
subject to audit, even the highest state officials such as the 
Hellenotamiae. 
The number of accountants who performed the accounting func-
tion for the state during the fifth century, as mentioned in the ac-
counting records, was thirty. This seems to coincide with the 
accountants included in the three accounting boards discussed by 
Aristotle. Whether the thirty accountants originally constituted one 
board or were divided into three boards is not clear from the sources 
available. 
The existence and execution of the aforementioned verification 
process as it relates to the accounting system is important. In addi-
tion to controls by independent boards there is also a formal basis 
for the establishment of accountability against those to whom public 
funds were entrusted. Furthermore, the execution of this verifica-
tion process implies the existence of accounting records of execu-
tion for all revenues and expenditures kept by the responsible pub-
lic officials. Finally, the comparison of actual amounts received and 
expended with the authorized amounts in the execution of audit 
substantiates further the integration of the budget system with the 
accounting system.17 Thus, it can be concluded that although the 
main purpose of the attest function was the discovery of fraud, in-
ternal controls were also evaluated by comparing the formalized 
budgets with the accounting records of execution.18 This conclu-
sion is somewhat contrary to the assumption that internal controls 
were not recognized in ancient times.19 
EXHIBIT A 
EXPENDITURES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE PARTHENON 
FOR THE YEAR 434 B.C. 
(Partial Translation) 
A. Amounts Received 
The following amounts were received by the commissioners on 
public works during the year when Anticles was their secretary, on 
the fourteenth Council when Metagenes was first secretary and 
Kratetos was archon of the Athenians: 
1. Balance from the previous year, 1,470 drachmas, 70 Lampsa-
cene and 27-1/6 Cyzicene golden staters. (lines 1-16) 
2. From the treasurers of Athena of whom Labreus was secretary, 
25,000 drachmas, (lines 17-20) 
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3. From sale of gold, having weight of 98 drachmas, 1,372 drach-
mas. (lines 21-23) 
4. From sale of ivory, having weight of 20 talents and 60 drach-
mas, 1,305 drachmas and 4 obols. (lines 24-26) 
B. Amounts Spent 
1. For rentals . . . . drachmas. (line 30) 
2. Wages to workers who quarried and loaded marble at Pente-
licus, 2,226 drachmas and 2 obols. (lines 31-33) 
3. Paid to statuaries on pediment-sculptures, 16,200 drachmas. 
(line 34) 
4. Salaries to staff members, 192 drachmas. (lines 35-36) 
5. Other construction costs, 1,800 drachmas. (line 37) 
C. Amounts Left at the End of the Year 
1. 70 Lampsacene and 27-1/6 Cyzicene golden staters. (lines 
40-43) 
Source: Tod, op. cit., pp. 112-113. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Costouros, pp. 78-100. 
2Rackham, pp. 135-147. 
3The Athenian senatorial year was divided into ten presidencies or prytanies. 
Each presidency of the Council and the Assembly was taken over by a committee 
of fifty representatives of the ten tribes for a period of 35-36 days, so that during 
the year all five hundred members of the Council could participate in the manage-
ment of state affairs. Magistrates, upon leaving office, submitted their accounts 
to a board of ten auditors, one from each tribe, appointed by the Council. 
4Adams, pp.323-325. 
5Adams, p. 317. 
6Adams, pp. 325-327. 
7Rackham, p. 135. 
8Rackham, p. 147. 
9Adams, p. 355. 
10Adams, p. 320. 
11Rackham, p. 147. 
12Murray, p. 301. 
13Adams, p. 327. 
14Vice, p. 453. 
15Rackham, p. 135. 
16Adams, pp. 93, 420. 
17Costouros, p. 159. 
18Costouros, pp. 122-125. 
19R. Gene Brown, pp. 2-4. 
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